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THE PETITIONER'S APPEAL FROM THE AMENDED ORDER ON 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND JUDGMENT WAS TIMELY FILED 
The Appellee, Julie (Hansen) Kik, asserts in her Brief of 
Appellee that this appeal should be dismissed as untimely because the 
original Order on Order to Show Cause & Judgment was entered on 
November 16, 2004, and the Notice of Appeal was filed on May 18, 2005, 
following the entry of the Amended Order on Order to Show Cause & 
Judgment on May 5, 2005. 
The original Order on Order to Show Cause & Judgment, 
submitted by the Respondent, Julie (Hansen) Kik, and signed and entered by 
the trial court on November 16, 2004, awarded judgment to the Petitioner, 
Greg J. Hansen, and against the Respondent, Julie (Hansen) Kik in the 
amount of $8,172.00. R. 89-94. 
On April 21, 2005, the Respondent, Julie (Hansen) Kik, filed 
her Motion to Amend Order on Order to Show Cause & Judgment Nunc Pro 
Tunc. R. 112-115. The motion asserted that the Respondent's counsel had 
made a "clerical" error in the preparation of the judgment by "inadvertently" 
4 
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awarding the Petitioner judgment against the Respondent. The 
Respondent's motion asserted that the judgment should be changed to reflect 
that the Respondent is awarded judgment in the sum of $8,172.00, against 
the Petitioner, rather than a judgment in favor of the Petitioner in the sum of 
$8,172.00. The motion asserted that the judgment should be amended "nunc 
pro tunc." 
On April 29, 2005, the Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, filed his 
objections to the amendment of the judgment nunc pro tunc acknowledging 
that the judgment should be amended to award the Respondent judgment 
against the Petitioner as the trial court had ruled at the hearing in October, 
2005, but asserted that the prior judgment in his favor be vacated and that 
the amended judgment not be entered nunc pro tunc. R. 119-121. 
On May 5, 2005, the trial court denied the Petitioner's 
objections to the motion to amend the judgment and signed the Amended 
Order on Order to Show Cause & Judgment stating, "There will not be two 
judgments outstanding, once the amended order is made "nuncpro tunc." 
On May 5, 2005, the trial court signed and entered the 
Amended Order on Order to Show Cause & Judgment. Paragraph 9, of the 
5 
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amended findings of fact and paragraph 1, of the amended judgment 
awarded the Respondent judgment against the Petitioner for $8,172.00. 
The time for appeal should be taken from the entry of the 
amended judgment against the Petitioner on May 5, 2005. The original 
judgment, entered November 16, 2004, had erroneously awarded the 
Petitioner judgment against the Respondent in the amount of $8,172.00. 
Trial courts often awarded judgments to, or against, one or 
more parties to an action and these judgments may be offsetting. 
A formal order signed and entered upon the erroneous 
assumption that it conformed to a direction of the trial court made after a 
hearing on the merits is more than a mere inadvertence. Dixon v. Dixon, 240 
P.2d 1211 (Utah 1952.) 
In this case the entry by the trial court of the original order and 
judgment, granting the Petitioner a judgment against the Respondent, was 
more than a mere inadvertence. The judgment of November 16, 2004, was 
awarded to the wrong party. The amended judgment, entered on May 5, 
2005, by the trial court changed the party that was awarded the judgment for 
$8,172.00. The amendment removed the judgment awarded erroneously to 
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the Petitioner and awarded the judgment to the other party, the Respondent. 
In this case the bleated entry of the amended judgment changed materially in 
that the Petitioner was awarded a judgment on November 16, 2004, and the 
amended judgment changed party to whom the judgment of $8,172.00, was 
awarded to the Respondent. The actual character and substance of the 
judgment was changed awarding the Respondent judgment of $8,172.00, 
and substituting that judgment for the November 16, 2004, judgment 
rendered in favor of the Petitioner. 
The judgment entered November 16, 2004, awarded the 
Petitioner judgment against the Respondent for $8,172.00. The Respondent 
was awarded judgment in the amount of $6,855.00. The Petitioner, upon the 
entry of the judgment upon the record in his favor on November 16, 2004, 
could have executed upon the judgment, or otherwise off-set the recorded 
judgment in his favor against the judgment entered for the Respondent. The 
amended judgment decreased the judgment in favor of the Petitioner and 
increased the value of the judgment awarded to the Respondent by the 
November 16, 2004, judgment. The corrected judgment changed the party 
the judgment was awarded to, vacated the erroneous judgment awarded the 
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Petitioner and increased the value of the judgment awarded to the 
Respondent. 
Moreover, the trial court substituted or vacated the Order on 
Order to Show Cause & Judgment with the Amended Order on Order to 
Show Cause & Judgment entered on May 5, 2005. The Respondent's 
motion to amend the erroneous judgment entered in favor of the Petitioner 
on November 16, 2004, was granted by the trial court. 
In Sittner v. Schriever, 2 P.3d 442 (Utah 2000), the Utah 
Supreme Court had occasion to consider the effect of a corrected judgment 
upon the timeliness of a Notice of Appeal under Rule 60(b), of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court, after citing authority for the 
proposition that normally a motion under Rule 60(b), does not extend the 
time within which an appeal must be taken stated, 
However, the period in which to appeal a final judgment is 
measured differently when the trial court grants the rule 60(b) 
motion. Specifically, "[I]f ... the court grants the [rule 60(b) 
motion and enters a new judgment, the time for appeal will date 
from the entry of that judgment." (internal citations omitted.) 
Indeed, a final, appealable order results "when the court not 
only relieves a party of judgment, but enters a corrected 
judgment so that there is nothing further to be decided by the 
8 
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district court." 12 Moore's Federal Practice Section 60.68[2] 
(3ded. 1997). 
In this case, on May 5, 2005, the trial court relieved the 
Respondent of the judgment it had entered against her in favor of the 
Petitioner for $8,172.00, when it entered the amended judgment. The trial 
court changed the party it had awarded one of the judgments to in the 
original judgment of November 16, 2004. The May 5, 2005, amended 
judgment changed the character of the November 16, 2004, judgment, by 
changing the party to whom that judgment was awarded, and the value of the 
judgment rendered and recorded against the Petitioner and in favor of the 
Respondent. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ENTER 
THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT AND THE AMENDED JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE THE ACTION WAS PROHIBITED BY AND VIOLATED 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
SECTION 78-12-22, AND THE JUDGMENTS ARE VOID 
The trial court was without jurisdiction to enter judgment 
against the Petitioner, Greg Hansen, upon the motion for order to show 
cause of the Respondent, Julie (Hansen) Kik, because the motion was filed 
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more than eight years after the entry of the decree of divorce in violation of 
the Statute of Limitations, Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-22. 
The judgment entered against Greg J. Hansen by the trial court, 
at the demand of the Respondent, Julie (Hansen) Kik, is void and time 
barred because the Respondent's claims were not brought by her until a date 
beyond the running of the eight year statute of limitations embodied in Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-12-22. The trial court was without jurisdiction 
to enter judgments against the Petitioner, both the erroneous judgment of the 
trial court entered on November 16,2004, and the amended judgment 
entered on May 5, 2005, are void and the judgments should be reversed and 
vacated. 
A trial court's jurisdiction is a question of law and a correction 
of error standard is applied. Glasmann v. Second Dist Court ex rel Weber 
County, 80 Utah 1, 12 P.2d 361 (1932); Kramer v. Pixton, 268 P. 1029 
(Utah 1928). The statute of limitations embodied in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-12-22, removes the trial court's jurisdiction to enter judgment 
against the Petitioner once the eight years has expired within which the 
10 
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Respondent could have bought her action against the Petitioner upon the 
decree of divorce. 
The lack of personal jurisdiction over the Petitioner in this 
cause, as well as the lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the 
litigation, can be raised at any time, including upon appeal to this Court. 
Glasmann v. Second Dist. Court ex rel. Weber County, 80 Utah 1,12 P.2d 
361(1932). 
The issue of whether a statute of limitations has expired is a 
question of law and the Court of Appeals reviews the conclusion for 
correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court. Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1999); Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 
P.2d 1131,1132 (Utah 1992); State v. Pena 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-22, provides: 
An action may be brought within eight years . . . upon a judgment or 
decree of any court of the United States, or of any state .. . within the 
United States. 
In this action, the Decree of Divorce was entered in the trial 
court on November 15,1994. R. 60-66. The case file reflects that no 
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pleadings were filed in the action following the entry of the decree until 
September 30, 2004, when Julie Kik first filed her motion for order to show 
cause requesting Mr. Hansen be held in contempt, requesting judgment for 
her equity in the marital residence and the return of personal property 
awarded to her or, in the alternative, a money judgment for the value of the 
personal property. R. 67-75. 
The statute of limitations expired on the claims of Julie 
(Hansen) Kik for $4,000.00, equity in the marital residence and upon her 
claim for personal property on Exhibit 1, to the Decree of Divorce, on 
November 14,2002.l 
Generally, "Statutes of limitation are intended to compel the 
exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time and to suppress stale 
and fraudulent claims so that claims are advanced while evidence to rebut 
them is still fresh." Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087,1091 
(Utah 1989). Statutes of limitations "are designed to promote justice by 
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to 
1
 The Decree of Divorce does not have an Exhibit 1. attached to it in the trial court's file, identifying items 
of personal property which the Respondent can now enforce. The Exhibit 1, offered by the Respondent and 
admitted at trial was "retyped" the day before the hearing and the Respondent "guessed" as to the value of 
the personal property identified thereon. Tr. 7, 19, 14-31. 
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slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 
have disappeared." Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 
(Utah 1983). 
It has been a long held proposition of law that a decree of 
divorce is subject to the eight year statute of limitations found in Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-12-22. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a), defines a "judgment" 
as "including a decree and any order from which an appeal lies." 
In Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme 
Court directly visited the issue of whether the eight year statute of 
limitations applies to decrees and orders in divorce actions and reviewed 
decades old precedent establishing that the limitation applies. See Beesley v. 
Badger, 240 P. 458 (Utah 1925), Openshaw v. Openshaw, 144 P.2d 528 
(Utah 1943). 
The rule has been recently reaffirmed by this Court in 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1999), when the Court 
had occasion to consider facts nearly identical to those in this case. In 
Kessimakis, id., the former wife requested enforcement of a provision of the 
decree of divorce ordering her former husband to execute and deliver 
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appropriate documents evidencing transfer of her interest in a closely held 
corporation. This Court, in determining that the former wife's enforcement 
claims were barred by the eight year statute of limitations stated: 
Ms. Kessimakis's action also presents a request for enforcement of the 
decree's requirement that Mr. Kessimakis "execute and deliver 
appropriate instruments evidencing the transfer" of an interest in the 
Corporation to Ms. Kessimakis. This provision of the decree created 
a judgment in Ms. Kessimakis's favor. See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a) 
(defining "judgment" as "includ[ing] a decree and any order from 
which an appeal lies") Ms. Kessimakis's action is thus subject to the 
eight year statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-
22(l)(1996(("An action may be brought within eight years . . . upon a 
judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state .. 
within the United States.") 
Statutes of limitations reflect our understanding that a party will 
generally choose to pursue a valid claim, rather than waiting 
indefinitely to do so. See 51 Am. Jur.2 Limitation of Actions Section 
17 (1970). They '"attempt to protect against the difficulties caused by 
lost evidence, faded memories and disappearing witnesses.'" Lund v. 
Hall, 938 P.2d 285,291 (Utah 1997) (quoting Byrne v. Ogle, 488 
P.2d 716, 718 (Alaska 1971)). In this case, the passage of time has 
created precisely those difficulties: the parties possess little evidence, 
documentary or otherwise, and several potential witnesses have died. 
We agree with the trial court that Ms. Kessimakis's effort to require 
Mr. Kessimakis to deliver documents of title showing her interest in 
the Corporation is barred by the eight year statute of limitations. See 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-22(1) (1996). 
In this action the Decree of Divorce was entered on November 
15, 1994, nearly 10 years before Ms. (Hansen) Kik chose to file her claim 
14 
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against Mr. Hansen for the $4,000.00, equity in the marital residence and her 
claim for unidentified items of personal property. She filed her enforcement 
action on September 30, 2004. 
The trial court lost jurisdiction to enforce the decree of divorce 
when the eight year statute of limitations for enforcement expired. The 
judgment against the Petitioner, Greg Hansen, entered by the trial court on 
November 16,2005, is void because the trial court was without jurisdiction 
to enter the judgment. The amended judgment entered by the trial court on 
May 5, 2005, was and is void because the amended judgment cannot become 
a valid judgment because of the amendment to the original void judgment 
entered by the trial court without jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a judgment 
against the Petitioner, Greg Hansen, once the eight year statute of limitations 
expired. 
The trial court granted the Respondent's Motion to Amend the 
Order on Order to Show Cause and Judgment on May 5, 2005. The 
amendment changed the party that was awarded judgment for $8,172.00, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from the Petitioner to the Respondent. The amended judgment increased the 
value of the recorded judgment for the Respondent and decreased the value 
of the recorded judgment for the Petitioner. The character and substance of 
the judgment was changed by the amendment of the November 16, 2004, 
judgment and the entry on the record of the corrected judgment. 
The trial court substituted the erroneous judgment entered on 
November 16, 2004, with the corrected judgment entered on May 5, 2005. 
The Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal challenging the corrected judgment 
awarded the Respondent on May 18,2005. 
The amended judgment of May 5, 2005, correcting the 
erroneous judgment entered by the trial court on November 16, 2004, is void 
because the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the judgment on 
November 16, 2004. The statute of limitations had expired depriving the 
trial court of jurisdiction to entertain an action on the decree of divorce 
entered November 15, 1994. Thus, both the judgment and the amendment 
judgment are void. 
The void judgment of the trial court, entered without subject 
matter jurisdiction, should be reversed and vacated. 
16 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this a day of February, 2006. 
)REW3.BERRYp?^ 
Attorney for AppeUdnt, \ 
Greg J. Hansen f ) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of February, 
2006,1 served upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class mail, two 
(2), true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to the 
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Douglas L. Neeley 
Attorney for Appellee 
1st South Main Street 
Post Office Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
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